美國(guó)聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)際貿(mào)易委員會(huì)（ITC）337-TA-1240號(hào)調(diào)查發(fā)表公眾利益意見(jiàn)書(shū)

　　翻譯人：李旭儀 暨南大學(xué)法學(xué)院/知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)學(xué)院 2022級(jí)研究生

　　指導(dǎo)與校對(duì)：仲春 暨南大學(xué)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)研究院副教授

　　一、意見(jiàn)書(shū)發(fā)布背景

　　2021年1月19日，美國(guó)國(guó)際貿(mào)易委員會(huì)（ITC）決定對(duì)UMTS和LTE蜂窩通信模塊及其產(chǎn)品（Certain UMTS and LTE Celluar Communication Modules and Products Containing the Same）發(fā)起337調(diào)查。該調(diào)查由荷蘭皇家飛利浦有限公司和飛利浦北美公司于2020年12月17日依據(jù)《美國(guó)1930年關(guān)稅法》第337節(jié)規(guī)定向ITC提出申請(qǐng)，指控對(duì)美出口、在美進(jìn)口或在美銷(xiāo)售的UMTS和LTE蜂窩通信模塊及其產(chǎn)品侵犯其專利權(quán)，請(qǐng)求發(fā)起337調(diào)查，并發(fā)布普遍排除令、有限排除令和禁止令。涉訴企業(yè)所屬國(guó)家分別為美國(guó)、德國(guó)、法國(guó)、英國(guó)等國(guó)，其中中國(guó)大陸企業(yè)（上海移遠(yuǎn)通信技術(shù)股份有限公司）一家。

　　2022年5月16日，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)（FTC）向ITC提交一份公共利益意見(jiàn)書(shū)，以回應(yīng)ITC關(guān)于對(duì)特定UMTS和LTE蜂窩通信模塊及其產(chǎn)品的調(diào)查（調(diào)查編碼為337-TA-1240）。

　　二、譯文

美國(guó)國(guó)際貿(mào)易委員會(huì)華盛頓特區(qū)

　　某些umts和lte蜂窩

　　通信模塊和含有相同成分的產(chǎn)品

關(guān)于公眾利益的意見(jiàn)書(shū)

聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)主席lina m. khan和

麗貝卡·凱利·斯勞特局長(zhǎng)

　　作為美國(guó)聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)（"FTC"）主席和專員，我們提交本聲明，以回應(yīng)美國(guó)國(guó)際貿(mào)易委員會(huì)（ITC）關(guān)于要求就第337-TA-1240號(hào)調(diào)查的公眾利益提交材料的通知1。

　　美國(guó)專利受到侵犯的專利權(quán)人可根據(jù)1930年關(guān)稅法第337條向美國(guó)國(guó)際貿(mào)易委員會(huì)( ITC )尋求專利侵權(quán)的補(bǔ)救。第337條授權(quán)ITC除其他事項(xiàng)外，對(duì)侵犯美國(guó)一項(xiàng)有效且可強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行的專利的美國(guó)產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行調(diào)查和禁止進(jìn)入。ITC作為一個(gè)至關(guān)重要的裁決地，為受害專利所有者提供救濟(jì)。然而，我們?cè)絹?lái)越擔(dān)心的是，那些承諾以公平、合理和非歧視性( FRAND )條款對(duì)SEP進(jìn)行許可的SEP持有人，正在尋求禁止產(chǎn)品進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)的排他性命令，以獲得對(duì)現(xiàn)有或潛在被許可方的影響力。我們認(rèn)為，如果申訴人尋求進(jìn)行許可，并且可以在不同的美國(guó)法庭通過(guò)補(bǔ)救措施得到補(bǔ)償，那么，一個(gè)禁止標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化產(chǎn)品進(jìn)入美國(guó)的禁令將損害消費(fèi)者和其他市場(chǎng)參與者，且未提供相稱利益。

　　這一調(diào)查為ITC提供了一個(gè)解決一個(gè)重要問(wèn)題的機(jī)會(huì)：在美國(guó)地方法院被要求確定公平、合理、非歧視( FRAND )許可條款的情況下2，基于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利( SEP )發(fā)布ITC禁令是否符合公共利益? ITC發(fā)布的包含F(xiàn)RAND承諾的SEPs的禁令，侵權(quán)是基于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化技術(shù)的實(shí)施，有可能對(duì)美國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、消費(fèi)者和創(chuàng)新造成實(shí)質(zhì)性損害。我們敦促I(mǎi)TC遵循第337 ( d ) ( 1 )和( f ) ( 1 )條的要求，考慮對(duì)自愿實(shí)施標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的被許可方發(fā)出排除令對(duì)美國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和消費(fèi)者的影響3。

　　互操作性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可以提供重要價(jià)值，因?yàn)樗鼈優(yōu)樾袠I(yè)參與者創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)公共平臺(tái)，可以增加競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、創(chuàng)新、產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量和選擇。它們還通過(guò)促進(jìn)采用有利于消費(fèi)者和其他市場(chǎng)參與者的方式的有價(jià)值技術(shù)，在支持和激勵(lì)專利權(quán)人的創(chuàng)新方面發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用4。但是，私人標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的制定也涉及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手之間的協(xié)議，其制定過(guò)程如果不通過(guò)“防止標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定過(guò)程受到具有經(jīng)濟(jì)利益成員的偏見(jiàn)，從而抑制產(chǎn)品競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的程序”，可能會(huì)取代市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和消費(fèi)者的選擇，從而引發(fā)“嚴(yán)重的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)損害可能性”。Allied Tube & Conduit Corp . V印度總公司，486美國(guó)，492，500-01 ( 1988 )。

　　由于互操作性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是在全行業(yè)范圍內(nèi)實(shí)施的，因此在這方面的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為可能特別有害。如果標(biāo)準(zhǔn)要求使用特定的專利技術(shù)，它將提高該技術(shù)的重要性。在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定機(jī)構(gòu)（SSO）和實(shí)施者投入大量資源開(kāi)發(fā)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和實(shí)施標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的產(chǎn)品之后，修訂標(biāo)準(zhǔn)或轉(zhuǎn)向新標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的成本可能會(huì)變得非常昂貴。一旦一個(gè)行業(yè)被“鎖定”在一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上，實(shí)施者（包括幫助開(kāi)發(fā)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的人）就不能再圍繞標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化技術(shù)進(jìn)行設(shè)計(jì)，需要SEP許可才能留在市場(chǎng)上5。因此，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化可以使“SEP持有者處于一種地位，要求獲得比專利技術(shù)（如果它沒(méi)有被SSO采用）更高的許可價(jià)值6。” 除了更高的價(jià)格和其他經(jīng)濟(jì)危害，在以標(biāo)準(zhǔn)為基礎(chǔ)的行業(yè)中，SEP所有者的這種“阻礙”可能會(huì)阻礙標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定活動(dòng)和協(xié)作，從而延誤創(chuàng)新7。

　　許多SSO要求SEP所有者提供FRAND許可承諾，以限制潛在損害競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的機(jī)會(huì)主義8。FRAND承諾通過(guò)確保選擇作出這種承諾的SEP所有者不會(huì)阻礙標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的使用，從而鼓勵(lì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的廣泛采用。FRAND許可承諾保證了SEP許可證的可獲得性，并保證了選擇此類承諾的SEP所有者不會(huì)利用鎖定機(jī)制以不合理的特許權(quán)使用費(fèi)來(lái)拖延實(shí)施者9。FRAND許可承諾還通過(guò)確保許可條款與SEP的價(jià)值掛鉤來(lái)防止劫持10。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，由于制定和實(shí)施標(biāo)準(zhǔn)需要大量資源，如果SEP所有者有重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)機(jī)會(huì)主義地扣留許可，阻止他們將符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的產(chǎn)品商業(yè)化，那么企業(yè)投資的可能性要小得多。FRAND許可解決了這些問(wèn)題，并支持標(biāo)準(zhǔn)設(shè)置促進(jìn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的方面。

　　在對(duì)違反第337條的行為（包括專利侵權(quán)行為）提出補(bǔ)救措施之前，委員會(huì)必須考慮補(bǔ)救措施對(duì)法定公共利益因素的影響：（1）公共衛(wèi)生與福利，（2）美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件，（3）美國(guó)同類或直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)，（4）美國(guó)消費(fèi)者11。我們認(rèn)識(shí)到，ITC一貫強(qiáng)調(diào)，對(duì)于侵犯知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)337條的行為，為申訴人提供有效補(bǔ)救措施的重要性，以及保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)對(duì)美國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境的益處12。適當(dāng)授予的禁令保留了專利制度激勵(lì)創(chuàng)新基礎(chǔ)的排他性，而禁令的威脅則對(duì)侵權(quán)具有重要的威懾作用13。然而，正如聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)以前所指出的那樣，F(xiàn)RAND承諾的SEPs所帶來(lái)的問(wèn)題與其他專利有很大的不同14。自愿的FRAND承諾證明，SEP所有者計(jì)劃通過(guò)合理?xiàng)l款的廣泛許可，而不是通過(guò)獨(dú)家使用來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)其知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的貨幣化15。在禁令威脅下進(jìn)行的特許權(quán)使用費(fèi)談判，可能會(huì)在某種程度上與FRAND承諾相抵觸，從而嚴(yán)重有利于專利權(quán)人，因?yàn)楸辉S可人可能同意支付超F(xiàn)RAND許可費(fèi)，以避免被排除在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)之外。避免允許機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的補(bǔ)救措施符合公共利益，包括將自愿被許可方排除在市場(chǎng)外，收取超F(xiàn)RAND許可費(fèi)16。

　　實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)這種行為的補(bǔ)救措施，破壞了FRAND承諾的目的。如果即使是愿意并能夠獲得FRAND許可的公司也被排除在市場(chǎng)之外，這種不確定性會(huì)阻礙對(duì)符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的產(chǎn)品和互補(bǔ)技術(shù)的投資。將符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的產(chǎn)品排除在市場(chǎng)之外，會(huì)減少其他SEP持有人和生產(chǎn)補(bǔ)充技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新者的回報(bào)，他們生產(chǎn)的互補(bǔ)技術(shù)被納入了被禁止的產(chǎn)品中，因此他們可能會(huì)收到較少的許可費(fèi)17。不恰當(dāng)?shù)慕钤诙唐趦?nèi)損害了消費(fèi)者利益，因?yàn)樗麄儽粍儕Z了想要的產(chǎn)品。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，如果企業(yè)選擇減少對(duì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化產(chǎn)品的投資，它還會(huì)通過(guò)減少創(chuàng)新、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、質(zhì)量和選擇來(lái)傷害消費(fèi)者。

　　特別是在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)施者是善意許可人的情況下--包括實(shí)施者承諾受雙方自己確定為FRAND的條款或?qū)⒂芍辛⒌牟脹Q/法院程序確定的條款的約束—禁令將違背公共利益。至少，委員會(huì)應(yīng)該要求SEP持有人證明實(shí)施者不愿意或不能接受FRAND許可，作為其公共利益分析的一部分，然后再發(fā)布禁令?？紤]到潛在被許可人獲得許可的意愿和能力，將支持ITC補(bǔ)救措施的平衡方法，遏制SEP持有人和潛在被許可人的機(jī)會(huì)主義，同時(shí)承認(rèn)SEP持有人和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)施者都有義務(wù)真誠(chéng)地進(jìn)行談判，以有意義地解決FRAND問(wèn)題。

　　一般來(lái)說(shuō)，當(dāng)法院被要求解決FRAND條款并能使SEP持有人得到補(bǔ)償時(shí)，排除性救濟(jì)是不協(xié)調(diào)的，也是違反公共利益的。我們鼓勵(lì)委員會(huì)在其公共利益評(píng)估中考慮目前的事實(shí)是否呈現(xiàn)出排除性救濟(jì)不符合公共利益的情況，至少對(duì)某些被告而言19。

　　在這種情況下，ALJ發(fā)現(xiàn)飛利浦已經(jīng)將其SEP授權(quán)給眾多被許可方，并且愿意授權(quán)被許可方，并且被許可方與飛利浦進(jìn)行了許可談判20。在特拉華州地區(qū)有幾個(gè)針對(duì)不同被訴人的未決案件，其中一方正在尋求法院為許可設(shè)定FRAND條款。當(dāng)?shù)貐^(qū)法院可以通過(guò)預(yù)付利息和確定未來(lái)的使用費(fèi)率來(lái)補(bǔ)償投訴人，即使是有限的排除令也不符合公共利益。

　　我們懇請(qǐng)ITC在考慮公共利益時(shí)，在決定如何對(duì)待作為美國(guó)地方法院對(duì)FRAND許可條款的裁決方的自愿SEP被許可人時(shí)，考慮上述內(nèi)容，并且在任何情況下，337條款的補(bǔ)救措施都不應(yīng)在該法院有機(jī)會(huì)作出裁決之前生效。

　　附原文：

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C.

　　In the Matter of

　　Inv. No. 337-TA-1240

　　CERTAIN UMTS AND LTE CELLULAR

　　COMMUNICATION MODULES AND

　　PRODUCTS CONTAINING THE SAME

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST OF

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CHAIR LINA M. KHAN AND

COMMISSIONER REBECCA KELLY SLAUGHTER

　　As Chair of the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a Commissioner of the FTC, we submit this Statement in response to the United States International Trade Commission’s Notice of Request for Submissions on the Public Interest in Investigation No. 337-TA-1240.

　　A patent holder whose U.S. patents have been infringed may seek redress for patent infringement from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 337 authorizes the ITC, among other things, to investigate and bar from entry into the United States products that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent. The ITC serves as a crucial adjudication forum that provides redress to harmed patent owners. However, we are increasingly concerned that SEP holders who have committed to license SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms are seeking exclusionary orders to ban products from the marketplace for the purpose of gaining leverage over existing or potential licensees. In our view, where a complainant seeks to license and can be made whole through remedies in a different U.S. forum, an exclusion order barring standardized products from the United States will harm consumers and other market participants without providing commensurate benefits.

　　This investigation presents the ITC with an opportunity to address an important issue: Is it in the public interest to issue an ITC exclusion order based on a standard essential patent (SEP) where a United States district court has been asked to determine fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms? An ITC-issued exclusion order involving FRAND-committed SEPs, where infringement is based on implementation of standardized technology, has the potential to cause substantial harm to U.S. competition, consumers, and innovation. We urge the ITC to follow the requirements of Sections 337(d)(l) and (f)(1) and consider the impact that issuing an exclusion order against a willing licensee implementing a standard would have on competition and consumers in the United Sates.

　　Interoperability standards can provide significant value, because they create a common platform for industry participants, which can increase competition, innovation, product quality, and choice. They also play a key role in supporting and incentivizing innovation by patent-holders by promoting the adoption of valuable technologies in ways that benefit consumers and other market participants. However, private standard setting also involves an agreement among competitors that can displace marketplace competition and consumer choice, and thus raise “serious potential for anticompetitive harm,” if not developed “through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition.” Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500-01 (1988).

　　Because interoperability standards are implemented on an industry-wide basis, anticompetitive conduct in this context has the potential to be particularly harmful. If the standard requires use of a particular patented technology, it elevates the importance of that technology over the alternatives. After standard setting organizations (SSOs) and implementers have invested substantial resources into developing the standard and products that implement the standard, it can become very expensive to either revise the standard or switch to a new standard. Once an industry is “l(fā)ocked in” to a standard, implementers (including those who helped develop the standard) can no longer design around standardized technologies and need SEP licenses to remain in the market. Standardization can thus put “SEP holders [] in a position to demand more for a license than the patented technology, had it not been adopted by the SSO, would be worth.” In addition to higher prices and other economic harms, such SEP owner “hold-up” in standards-based industries may discourage standard setting activities and collaboration, which can delay innovation.

　　Many SSOs require FRAND licensing commitments from SEP owners to limit the potential for competition-harming opportunism. FRAND commitments encourage widespread adoption of standards by ensuring that SEP owners that have chosen to make such commitments will not block use of the standard. FRAND licensing commitments provide assurance that SEP licenses will be available and that SEP owners that have chosen to make such commitments will not take advantage of lock-in to hold up implementers for unreasonable royalties. FRAND licensing commitments also prevent hold-up by ensuring that licensing terms are tied to the value of the SEP. In the long run, because developing and implementing a standard requires significant resources, firms would be much less likely to invest in either if there were a significant risk that SEP owners would opportunistically withhold licenses to block them from commercializing standard compliant products. FRAND licensing solves for these problems and supports the pro-competitive aspects of standard setting.

　　Before issuing a remedy for a violation of Section 337, including a remedy for patent infringement, the Commission must consider the effect of the remedy on the statutory public interest factors: (1) the public health and welfare, (2) competitive conditions in the United States economy, (3) production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and (4) United States consumers. We recognize that the ITC has consistently emphasized the importance of providing complainants with an effective remedy for intellectual property-based Section 337 violations and the benefit to competitive conditions in the United States of enforcing intellectual property rights. An appropriately granted exclusion order preserves the exclusivity that serves as the foundation of the patent system’s incentives to innovate, and the threat of an exclusion order provides a significant deterrent to infringement. As the FTC has previously noted, however, FRAND committed SEPs present considerably different issues than other patents. A voluntary FRAND commitment provides evidence that the SEP owner planned to monetize its IP though broad licensing on reasonable terms rather than through exclusive use. A royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusion order may be weighted heavily in favor of the patentee in a way that is in tension with the FRAND commitment because a licensee may agree to pay supra-FRAND royalties to avoid being excluded from the market for standardized products. There is a public interest in avoiding remedies that allow for opportunistic behavior, including excluding willing licensees from the market to extract supra-FRAND royalties.

　　Implementing remedies that reward such behavior undermines the purpose of the FRAND commitment. If even firms that are willing and able to take FRAND licenses can be excluded from the market, this uncertainty can discourage investment in standard-compliant products and complementary technologies. Excluding standard-compliant products from the market also reduces the returns to other SEP holders and innovators producing complementary technologies that are otherwise incorporated into the excluded products, who may thus receive reduced royalty streams. An inappropriate exclusion order harms consumers in the short term by depriving them of desired products. It also harms consumers in the longer run through reduced innovation, competition, quality, and choice if firms choose to reduce investments in standardized products.

　　Particularly where the standard implementer is a willing licensee—including cases where the implementer commits to be bound by terms that either the parties themselves will determine are FRAND or that will be determined by a neutral adjudication/in a court proceeding—an exclusion order would be contrary to the public interest. At a minimum, the Commission should require a SEP holder to prove that the implementer is unwilling or unable to take a FRAND license as part of its public interest analysis before issuing an exclusion order. Considering the willingness and ability of the potential licensee to take a license would support a balanced approach to ITC remedies by curbing opportunism by both SEP holders and potential licensees while recognizing that both the SEP holder and the standards implementer have a duty to negotiate in good faith towards a meaningful resolution of FRAND issues.

　　As a general matter, exclusionary relief is incongruent and against the public interest where a court has been asked to resolve FRAND terms and can make the SEP holder whole. We encourage the Commission to consider in its public interest assessment whether the facts at hand present a case where exclusionary relief would not be in the public interest, at least with respect to certain Respondents.

　　In this case, the ALJ found that Philips has licensed its SEPs to numerous licensees and is willing to license Respondents, and that Respondents were engaged in licensing negotiations with Phillips. There are several pending cases in the District of Delaware against various Respondents in which a party is seeking to have the court set FRAND terms for a license. When a District Court can make a complainant whole, both for past royalties with prejudgment interest and by establishing a future royalty rate, even a limited exclusion order is not in public interest.

　　We respectfully urge the ITC, in its consideration of the public interest, to take into account the foregoing when deciding how to treat willing SEP licensees who are parties to a U.S. District Court’s determination of FRAND licensing terms and under no circumstances should Section 337 remedies should take effect before the that Court has had the opportunity to render a decision.

　　Dated: May 16, 2022

　　Respectfully Submitted.

　　注釋

　　1.https://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337_1240_notice_01192021sgl.pdf.

　　2.中華人民共和國(guó)商務(wù)部—中國(guó)貿(mào)易救濟(jì)信息網(wǎng)，特定UMTS和LTE蜂窩通信模塊及其產(chǎn)品美國(guó)337調(diào)查案件分析報(bào)告。http://www.cacs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/flfwpt/zscqjbl/aqfx/202103/168326.html

　　3.We take no position on the facts of Investigation No. 1240. This Statement also does not address whether seeking an exclusion order for FRAND-encumbered SEPs would violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, or Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. See, e.g., Compl., In re Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013), 我們對(duì)第1240號(hào)調(diào)查的事實(shí)不采取任何立場(chǎng)。本聲明也不涉及為受FRAND約束的SEP尋求排除令是否會(huì)違反《聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)法》第5條，15 U.S.C.§45，或《謝爾曼法》第1或2條，15 U.S.C.§45?！段瘑T會(huì)法》第5條，15 U.S.C. §45，或《謝爾曼法》第1或2條，15 U.S.C. §§1-2。見(jiàn)，例如，起訴書(shū)。關(guān)于摩托羅拉移動(dòng)有限責(zé)任公司和谷歌公司，F(xiàn)TC文件編號(hào)121-0120（2013年1月3日）。https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolacmpt.pdf (alleging violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act).

　　4.This statement uses the terms FRAND and RAND interchangeably to denote the same substantive type of commitment. The specific RAND or FRAND obligations will vary by standard setting organization. 這一表述用FRAND和RAND兩個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)互換表示同一實(shí)質(zhì)性類型的承諾。具體的RAND或FRAND義務(wù)會(huì)因標(biāo)準(zhǔn)設(shè)定組織而異。

　　5.Before issuing a remedy for a violation of Section 337, the Commission must consider the effect of the remedy on the statutory public interest factors: (1) the public health and welfare, (2) competitive conditions in the United States economy, (3) production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and (4) United States consumers. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d)(1), (f)(1). 在對(duì)違反第337條的行為發(fā)出補(bǔ)救措施之前，委員會(huì)必須考慮補(bǔ)救措施對(duì)法定公共利益因素的影響：( 1 )公共衛(wèi)生與福利，( 2 )美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件，( 3 )在美國(guó)生產(chǎn)類似或直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的物品，( 4 )美國(guó)消費(fèi)者。19 U.C. § 1337 ( D ) ( 1 )，( f ) ( 1 ) .

　　6.See, e.g., Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 30, 2013), 見(jiàn)，E . G .，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)基本專利糾紛和反壟斷法：在小組委員會(huì)審理反壟斷問(wèn)題，美國(guó)司法委員會(huì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)政策和消費(fèi)者權(quán)利（2013年7月30日）https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7-30-13MunckTestimony.pdf (prepared statement of Fed. Trade Comm’n at 3-8).

　　7.See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition at 34 n. 8 (Apr. 2007), 見(jiàn)，E.G.，美國(guó)司法部和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)貿(mào)易C委員會(huì)，反壟斷執(zhí)法與知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)利：促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。34n.8 ( 2007年4月)https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/antitrust-enforcement-and-intellectual-propertyrights-promoting-innovation-and-competition-report.s.department-justice-and-federal-tradecommission/p040101promotinginnovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf (SEP owner “may have significant market power” if “it can enforce its patent rights to prevent others from making products that conform to the standard.”). ( SEP所有者'如果'能夠?qū)嵤┢鋵＠麢?quán)，防止他人生產(chǎn)符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的產(chǎn)品'，則可能具有顯著的市場(chǎng)勢(shì)力' )

　　8.Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Patent hold-up exists when the holder of a SEP demands excessive royalties after companies are locked into using a standard.”). 微軟公司訴摩托羅拉公司，795 F.3d 1024，1031（第九巡回法庭，2015）。另見(jiàn)愛(ài)立信公司訴D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“當(dāng)SEP的持有人在公司被鎖定使用一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)后要求過(guò)高的專利費(fèi)時(shí)，就會(huì)出現(xiàn)專利滯留。當(dāng)公司被鎖定使用一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)后，專利持有者要求過(guò)高的專利費(fèi)?！保?。

　　9.Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies With Competition at 234 (Mar. 2011), 聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)，不斷變化的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)市場(chǎng)：將專利通知和補(bǔ)救措施與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)統(tǒng)一起來(lái)，234（2011年3月），https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplacealigning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf.

　　10.See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “development of standards . . . creates an opportunity for companies to engage in anti-competitive behavior” such as hold-up, and that RAND commitments “mitigate the risk that a SEP holder” will engage in such conduct); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (“FRAND commitments become important safeguards against monopoly power.”). We recognize that standardization may allow both SEP holders and implementers to engage in opportunism. 例如參見(jiàn)，微軟公司V 摩托羅拉公司，795F.3D 1024，1030-31 (第9次CIR ) 2015年) (注意到"標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的制定. . . . .為企業(yè)從事諸如'掛牌'等反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為創(chuàng)造了機(jī)會(huì)，而RAND承諾'緩解了SEP持有者從事此類行為的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)' )；Broadcom Corp . V高通公司，501F . 3D297，314 ( 3D CIR )。2007年) ( " FRAND承諾成為反對(duì)壟斷權(quán)力的重要保障。" )我們認(rèn)識(shí)到標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化可以使SEP持有者和實(shí)施者都參與機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。

　　11.U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, supra note 5. at 35 n.11 (“hold up may cause firms to sink less investment in developing and implementing standards.”). 美國(guó)司法部和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)貿(mào)易委員會(huì)，反壟斷執(zhí)法與知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)：促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，上注5 .在35 n . 11（“擱置可能導(dǎo)致企業(yè)在制定和實(shí)施標(biāo)準(zhǔn)方面的投資減少。投資于制定和實(shí)施標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。）

　　12.See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231-33 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 例如，見(jiàn)愛(ài)立信公司訴D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231-33（聯(lián)邦巡回法院，2014）。

　　13.19 U.S.C. §§1337(d)(1), (f)(1).

　　14.Comm’n Op., In re Certain Digital Television Products and Certain Products Containing Same and Methods of Using Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-617 (Apr. 2009) at 16 (The ITC has consistently held that the benefit of lower prices to consumers does not outweigh the benefit of providing complainants with an effective remedy for an intellectual property-based Section 337 violation.”) (“Concerns that the issuance of remedial orders will harm American business are outweighed by the benefit to competitive conditions in the United States gained by enforcing valid intellectual property rights.”). Comm‘n Op .，in re某些數(shù)字電視產(chǎn)品和某些包含相同的產(chǎn)品及使用相同的方法，Inv。第337 - TA-617號(hào)( 2009年4月) 16 (‘ITC一貫認(rèn)為，降價(jià)給消費(fèi)者帶來(lái)的好處并不超過(guò)為申訴人提供基于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的第337條違法行為的有效補(bǔ)救的好處.’) (‘擔(dān)心補(bǔ)救令的發(fā)布會(huì)損害美國(guó)企業(yè)，而被強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行有效知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)所獲得的對(duì)美國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件的好處所抵消’)。

　　15.In such circumstances, short run price increases may benefit consumers in the long run by providing incentives for innovation, consistent with the proper role of the patent system. 在這種情況下，短期內(nèi)的價(jià)格上漲可能會(huì)通過(guò)提供創(chuàng)新激勵(lì)而使消費(fèi)者長(zhǎng)期受益，這與專利制度應(yīng)有的作用相一致。

　　16.Statement on the Public Interest, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (June 6, 2012), 關(guān)于公共利益的聲明，聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)，關(guān)于某些無(wú)線通信設(shè)備、便攜式音樂(lè)和數(shù)據(jù)處理設(shè)備、計(jì)算機(jī)及其部件，Inv. No. 337-TA-745（2012年6月6日）。https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-unitedstates-international-trade-commission-concerning-certain-wireless-communication/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf; Statement on the Public Interest, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In re Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752 (June 6, 2012), 關(guān)于公共利益的聲明，聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)，關(guān)于某些游戲和娛樂(lè)游戲機(jī)。337-TA-752號(hào)文件（2012年6月6日）。https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-united-statesinternational-trade-commission-concerning-certain-gaming-and-entertaining/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf.

　　17.Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies With Competition at 235 (Mar. 2011), 聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)，不斷發(fā)展的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)市場(chǎng)：使專利通知和補(bǔ)救措施與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)保持一致 235（2011年3月），https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplacealigning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf (“A prior RAND commitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the injunction and ongoing royalties will not irreparably harm the patentee.”); Cf. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). （“先前的RAND承諾可以提供強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù)，證明拒絕禁令和持續(xù)的使用費(fèi)不會(huì)對(duì)專利權(quán)人造成不可挽回的傷害?！保?參考蘋(píng)果公司訴摩托羅拉公司，757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014)，被Williamson訴Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 以其他理由推翻。

　　18.The Federal Circuit has also recognized that “the public has an interest in encouraging participation in standard-setting organizations but also in ensuring that SEPs are not overvalued.” Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332. 聯(lián)邦巡回法院也承認(rèn)，“公眾對(duì)鼓勵(lì)參與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定組織有興趣，但也要確保SEP不被高估標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定組織，但也要確保SEPs不被高估”。蘋(píng)果公司，757 F.3d at 1332.

　　19.See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity of Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 421, 437 (2007) (“From the perspective of the patent system, an injunction in favor of the small-component patentee may well be robbing Peter to pay Paul.”). 參見(jiàn)，例如，Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity of Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 421, 437 (2007) （“從專利制度的角度來(lái)看，有利于小部件專利權(quán)人的禁令很可能是在搶劫彼得。從專利制度的角度來(lái)看，有利于小部件專利權(quán)人的禁令很可能是劫富濟(jì)貧?！保?。

　　20.Statement on the Public Interest, Fed. Trade Comm’n Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, In re Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (July 10, 2015), 關(guān)于公共利益的聲明，聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)主席伊迪絲-拉米雷斯，關(guān)于某些3G移動(dòng)電話及其組件，Inv No. Handsets and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (July 10, 2015),https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/682011/150714publicinterestftc1.pdf

　　21.We take no position on whether the Respondents are similarly situated with respect to the relief requested in the district court. 對(duì)于被告人是否與區(qū)法院所要求的救濟(jì)有類似的情況，我們不采取任何立場(chǎng)。

　　22.See, e.g., Final Initial Determination, In re Certain UMTs and LTE Cellular Communications Modules and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 1, 2022) at 286; Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding, In re Certain UMTs and LTE Cellular Communications Modules and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 15, 2022) at 17, 23-28; See Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding, In re Certain UMTs and LTE Cellular Communications Modules and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 15, 2022) at 23-28 (noting that downstream licensees had not been approached about licensing until shortly before the complaint in this investigation was filed and thus there was not enough time for negotiations to meaningfully develop). At least one Respondent has affirmed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware that it will take a license on the FRAND terms set by the court, including payment for any past use. RX-0139C (1st Antonitsch Decl.) at 2 ?? 5, 6; RX-0147C (2d Antonitsch Decl.) at 2 ?? 5, 6. 例如見(jiàn)，最終初步裁定，關(guān)于某些UMTs和LTE蜂窩通信模塊和包含相同的產(chǎn)品，Inv No. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 1, 2022) at 286; Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding. 補(bǔ)救措施和擔(dān)保，關(guān)于某些UMT和LTE蜂窩通信模塊和產(chǎn)品，Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 15, 2022) at 17, 23-28；見(jiàn)建議的決定補(bǔ)救措施和擔(dān)保，關(guān)于某些UMTs和LTE蜂窩通信模塊和產(chǎn)品，Inv No. 337-TA-1240（2022年4月15日），第23-28頁(yè)。直到本調(diào)查中的投訴提出前不久，才與下游被許可人接觸，因此談判沒(méi)有足夠的時(shí)間來(lái)進(jìn)行有意義的發(fā)展）。至少有一個(gè)答辯人向特拉華州地區(qū)的美國(guó)地方法院確認(rèn)了美國(guó)特拉華州地區(qū)法院確認(rèn)，它將按照法院規(guī)定的FRAND條款獲得許可。包括為任何過(guò)去的使用付費(fèi)。

（本文僅代表作者個(gè)人觀點(diǎn)，不代表知產(chǎn)財(cái)經(jīng)立場(chǎng)）